"This book offers a re-reading of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Rosenzweig. It argues that within the structure of their thinking lies a notion of the absolute which can be recognised as philosophy's higher education. This higher education is contained within and arises out of dualisms that are central to the work of each thinker: formation and finality (Kant), master and slave (Hegel), being and time (Heidegger), recollection and repetition (Kierkegaard), will to power and eternal return (Nietzsche), and fire and rays (Rosenzweig). The book argues that the dualisms have a speculative and therefore an educational significance which underpins the coherence of each thinker, and shows how, in each case, there subsists a notion of philosophy's higher education. The result of this investigation, therefore, is not only a radical re-interpretation of these philosophers, but also an ambitious attempt at unifying their work around another dualism, the relation of philosophy and education. It is within this latter relation that the book argues that the absolute can be realised. TOC:Preface. Acknowledgements. Introduction.- What is philosophy's higher education?- Kant: formation and finality.- Hegel: master and slave.- Heidegger: being and time.- Kierkegaard: recollection and repetition.- Nietzsche: will to power and eternal return.- Rosenzweig: fire and rays.- The end of culture.- Index."
Preface Acknowledgements Introduction What is philosophy's higher education? Chapter 1 Kant: formation and finality Chapter 2 Hegel: master and slave Chapter 3 Heidegger: being and time Chapter 4 Kierkegaard: recollection and repetition Chapter 5 Nietzsche: will to power and eternal return Chapter 6 Rosenzweig: fire and rays The end of culture Index
At about the age of 13 I began to realise that my formal education was separating itself off from my philosophical education. Of course, at the time I did not know it in this way. I experienced it as a split between what I was being taught and my experience of what I was being taught. It was, I now know, the philosophical experience of formal schooling. It was not until beginning the study of sociology at 16 that I came across the idea of dualisms¿pairs of opposites that always appeared together but were never reconciled. In sociology it was the dualism of the individual and society. The question most asked in our classes was always regarding which aspect of the dualism dominated the other. The answer we always leaned towards was that both were mutually affected by the other. The answer seemed to lie somewhere in the middle. It was only at university, first as an undergraduate and then as a postgraduate, that I came across the idea of the dialectic. Slowly I began to recognise that the dualisms which plagued social theory¿I and we, self and other, good and evil, modernity and post-modernity, autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and nature, truth and relativism, and so many more¿were not only dialectical in being thought about, but also that the thought of them being dialectical had an even stranger quality. It was the same experience as being at school.