Nature of War

Any state at war attempts to steer the conflict to the point where it can demonstrate its relative advantage. Thus underlying each war is a struggle over its particular nature, and in a dynamic process each side attempts to shape a war paradigm that suits its own relative strengths, while the adversary attempts to impose its preferred paradigm on the conflict. Israel, for example, seemingly has an edge in military effectiveness, and has therefore always preferred short, decisive wars. Its enemies, however, have an overall advantage in stamina and ability to leverage the international system. They therefore strive to lengthen the war and bring Israel to the point of defeat through attrition of the Israeli political-civilian system. In this book, Ron Tira examines the different aspects that characterise a war, from the centre of gravity to be attacked to the elements constituting military decision, as they are manifested in "simple" symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars versus a state opponent; guerrilla warfare; parallel warfare; and next generation warfare. The author first surveys types of war and the circumstances whereby the classical doctrine of war is progressively less valid, and then devises additional analytical tools necessary to understand these more complex conflicts. The study examines the relevance of classical doctrine and applies these new tools and concepts to a range of historical examples, from the Second Punic War to World War II to some of Israel's main wars. The final case evaluated is the next generation of wars that Israel and other Western countries may find themselves fighting -- wars against states that have adopted the guerrilla paradigm. Published in association with the Institute for National Security Studies, Israel.

Introduction: The Erosion of Classical Military Doctrine; Doctrinal Background; "Simple" Symmetrical Wars; The Complex Asymmetrical War Against a Regular Opponent: The Picture becomes; Multidimensional Asymmetrical Wars Against Non-State Opponents: Same Theater of Operations, Different Objectives; Parallel War: One War with Two Non-Convergent Campaigns; The Second Lebanon War & Operation Cast Lead: Parallel Wars Against a Non-State Opponent; The Future War: Parallel War Against a State Enemy That Has Adjusted to Fighting Against RMA & Adopted a Guerrilla Paradigm; Conclusion: "Rock-Paper-Scissors"; Index.