David Hume¿s Humanity

Scott Yenor argues that David Hume's reputation as a skeptic is greatly exaggerated. In David Hume's Humanity, Yenor shows how Hume's skepticism is a moment leading Hume to defend a philosophy that is grounded in the inescapable assumptions of common life. Humane virtues reflect the proper reaction to the complex mixture of human faculties that define the human condition. These gentle virtues best find their home in the modern commercial republic, of which England is the leading example. Hume's defense of both common life philosophy and humanity are, however, flawed by his secretly dogmatic assumptions about the nature of history and his Enlightened approach to religious teachings and psychology. This study makes the case for Hume's manner of grounding philosophy in common life is essential to any reinvigoration of the humanities. It ultimately holds that Hume's practice of that philosophy is seriously flawed, but that a more philosophic philosophy of common life is available.

1. The Promise of Hume's Philosophy of Common Life
2. 'Nothing but Sophistry and Illusion': Metaphysical Speculation Before Hume
3. Active Sovereignty in Natural and Moral Philosophy
4. 'Mitigated Scepticism' and Our 'Mixed Kind of Life': The Philosophic Modesty of Hume's Science of Common Life
5. The Liberal Imagination and the Problem of Abstract Speculative Principles in Politics
6. Humanity and Commerce
7. Religious Revolution and England's Humane Political Constitution
8. Religious Belief and Hume's Philosophy of Common Life
9. Humanity and Theology in Hume's Religious Dialogues
10. Toward a More Philosophical Philosophy of Common Life