Peavie, B: Intelligence Sharing in Bosnia

US participation in expeditionary operations after the end of the cold war, 1991, is indicative of a shift in national security strategy from containment to engagement. Participation is at best multinational, at its most challenging, coalition. Sharing intelligence in a coalition environment, especially a stability and support operation was a challenge by design. The intelligence systems used in Bosnia from 1995-1997 were developed for a different kind of conflict, for exploitation in a conventional war. The implementation of inoperable, stovepiped, technology was indicative of a mindset that prepared for unilateral operations as oppose to multinational stability operations. The NATO led Implementation Force IFOR, eventually became a 60,000 person, thirty-six- nation coalition force. The implementation force consisted of both Partnership for Peace nations as well as non-NATO countries. US intelligence sharing doctrine did not reflect the adjustments that professionals made on the ground to embrace the multinational composition of the division. This monograph examines intelligence sharing doctrine, practices, and challenges during Operation Joint Endeavor, the first out of area employment of NATO, particularly for the operational commander. The monograph shows how intelligence systems developed for the cold war are inadequate for the stability and support environment. Using intelligence principles for multinational operations it explores how effective the employment of intelligence sharing was in Bosnia from December 1995 to 1997. Sharing intelligence in a SASO environment is so inherently complex that cold war policies and systems adversely affect the quality of intelligence. This environment requires primacy of intelligence disciplines that were not the cold war focus. Bosnian conflict demanded synthesis of political, cultural, economic, ethnic, information, human intelligence (HUMINT), an intelligence discipline that the US Army arguably neglected during the cold